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How the Rose Government Gradually Destroyed the Process of the Informal Georgian-Abkhazian Meetings

November 22, 2010
Paata Zakareishvili,paatazak@access.sanet.ge

This article will attempt to expose the policy of the government of Georgia based on concrete facts which, in my opinion work against the goal of achieving direct and regular relations between Georgians and Abkhazians. Further, the implementation of this policy has resulted in the destruction of the permanent informal Georgian-Abkhaz meetings. This article-aside from its final paragraphs was completed in September of 2005, with the final paragraphs added recently.

On July 31, 2005 the 15th Georgian/Abkhaz meeting took place in Vienna, Austria. Its purpose and focus was to foster the establishment of new conflict resolution approaches between the two sides. The attendees of the meeting on the Abkhazian side consisted of the Secretary of the de-facto Security Council of Abkhazia Stanislav Lakoba, the de-facto Vice-Primer of Abkhazia Leonid Lakerbaia, the Chairman of the de-facto Central Election Commission Batal Tabaghua and the de-facto Advisor to the President of Abkhazia Sokrat Jinjolia. The State Minister of Georgia Giorgi Khaindrava, Deputy State Minister Giorgi Volsk and Project Coordinator Paata Zakareishvili participated on the Georgian side.

Irakli Alasania, the Personal Representative of the President of Georgia for the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, was also scheduled to attend the meeting. However, at the last minute Mr. Alasania cancelled his trip to Vienna and failed to provide a reason for his nonattendance. Mr. Alasania’s sudden cancellation highlights the deplorable political trends that exist in Georgia for which I am going to document in greater detail in the ensuing article.

About the Process

The meetings are held in seminar-form and the 15th round was held in Vienna. The format of these meetings is termed the “Schlaining Process”, due to the fact that the first two meetings were held in the small town of Stadtschlaining, Austria. 83 people in total took part in all 15 meetings. Among them, 45 participants were from Abkhazia and 38 from Georgia. The final 20th meeting was held in London (July 26-30, 2007).  In all, 59 Abkhaz and 56 Georgian participants took part in 20 meetings. The individual list of participants is available and can be published upon request.

The meetings have been held regularly since February of 2000 and they aim to create an open and free forum within the framework of conflict resolution. The meetings offer both parties the opportunity to discuss and analyze both auspicious and negative factors of the conflict. 

The meetings are also informal, unofficial and confidential. The parties are not represented as delegations. Thus, no official decisions are made at the meetings. The participants do not represent any institutions or organizations; they represent only themselves and take part in the meetings as experts. They work based on the Chatham House principle– which requires that the participants or conflict parties shall not be publicly quoted. This form of confidentiality fosters the exchange of sincere, direct and principled dialogue between the two parties.

An essential and important aspect of the project is that high-ranking officials, politicians and experts from the Georgian and Abkhazian sides participate in the meetings. Third party representatives ( representatives of Russia or representatives of international organizations – do not participate in these meetings). Thus, this is the only format where:

•    Georgian and Abkhaz politicians have the unique opportunity to regularly and consistently  lead informal dialogue confidentially and without the participation of  third parties ;
•    through studying and considering the positions and interests of the opposite side, parties are able to identify their own strategy and tactical steps;
•    through dialogue, each party is able to define their visions on various issues and consequently prepare for the future or for other official or unofficial meetings;
•    Representatives are able to introduce one another and test new proposals and ideas which they have designed back at home.

The organizer of the first 14 meetings was the German organization The Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management (Berlin) and the British organization Conciliation Resources (London). These organizations did not take part in the Schlaining Process as conflict parties. They never expressed their position regarding the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. They only facilitated the meetings without participating in the exchange of dialogue.

The Conciliation Resources Organization has been working on the peaceful reconciliation process for the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict since 1997. It has tried to support permanent dialogue between the parties and has tried to convince politicians, officials and civil activists to try strive for resolution outcomes that are democratic and non-violent.

The Essence of the Problem

Between 2004 and 2005, the general civil and political situation had changed in both Georgia and Abkhazia. Both societies, through elections and the protection of the election results, moved away from non-democratic, corrupt  and inadequate old systems of governance. This occurred when new regimes came to power.  The conflict resolution process also took on a new dynamic in accordance with these new political changes. This dynamic was first evident in the new Georgian policy which possessed both positive and negative attributes:

The following position, which was not evident during Shevardnadze’s government, became evident in the new government: the new government of Georgia did its best not to allow executive officials within the Georgian political establishment to take part in the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian unofficial meetings. Today, this position has become a trend and if we do not pay attention to it, it might have an irreversible negative impact on Georgia’s state interests. The abovementioned “Schlaining Process” encountered this problem too.

The First Precedent

The first concerning signs appeared during the Georgian-Ossetian unofficial meeting in Ljubljana on February 7-13, 2005. The meeting was organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, (London, UK). MPs Giga Bokeria (currently Deputy Foreign Minister of Georgia) and Giorgi Arveladze were invited to the meeting. They had agreed to participate in advance and the Ossetian side was eager to meet the leading politicians of the ruling party at the informal meeting. A week before their departure, we learned that the President of Georgia refused to allow MPs Bokeria and Arveladze to participate in the Georgian-Ossetian dialogue. Old and ungrounded reasons were put forth as reasons behind this refusal. It is thought by some in the Georgian government that the meeting of Georgian politicians with officials from the separatist regions abroad was disadvantageous for Georgian state interests and similar meetings were sensible only on Georgian territory. Most participants had negative reactions to the president’s attitude towards the meeting. On January 31, when the parliamentary majority met the president, this issue caused serious controversy and much discussion. In fact, it was the strange and groundless principles of the president that helped the meeting in Ljubljana become a failure. Formally, the situation was rescued by the tragic death of then Georgian Prime-Minister Zurab Zhvania. The meeting was postponed. Naturally, the death of the prime-minister covered the real reason for the delay of the Georgian-Ossetian informal meeting and we had a chance to justify ourselves before the Ossetian side and the international organizations. The meeting in Ljubljana was held on March 14-18 but in a simplified format. MP Davit Zurabishvili represented the Georgian authority and was not considered to be a member of the President’s close circle.  Consequently, his participation in the meeting did not mean participation in the decision-making process in Georgian politics (MP Davit Zurabishvili left the majority in summer of 2005 and became the member of the opposition faction of the Parliament of Georgia’s Democratic Front).

A month later, on April 7, the President of Georgia made a statement which publicly demonstrated the new Georgian policy towards de-facto authorities of the separatist regions: “We have finished meetings with Kokoyti and Bagapsh in other cities. I am not going to meet them. I will not meet them in any other places. If they want something, let them come to Tbilisi. I can give them the address of my office and I am ready to meet them and speak openly (“Republic of Georgia, # 81, April 8, 2005).

After the failed meetings in Ljubljana, we consulted with representatives of the ruling party in the Georgian government; more precisely with Giga Bokeria, Givi Targamadzeand Nika Rurua. We asked:  is it worth it to arrange the meeting of high-ranking officials in the Georgian government with the influential politicians of the separatist regions without the representatives of the Russian side? They clearly stated: similar meetings are necessary.

Repetition of the Precedent

For April 23-28, 2005 we planned the 14th meeting of the “Schlaining Process” which was to be held in Oxford, United Kingdom. State Minister of Georgia Gia Khaindrava, the President’s Representative to Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti region Kakha Ardia, MP Nika Gvaramia and the Personal Representative of the President to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict Irakli Alasania were invited to the meeting from the Georgian side. Mr. Irakli expressed his readiness to participate in such an important meeting from the very beginning. On the Abkhaz side, together with other important politicians, Secretary of the de-facto Security Council of Abkhazia Stanislav Lakoba took part in the meeting. We thought meeting with him was very important for the president’s personal representative in the conflict. Suddenly, several days before departure, Irakli Alasania informed us that he faced some problems and could participate in the meeting for only part of the meeting. On his way to the USA, Irakli Alasania used the time between his two flights in London to attend the introductory part of the meeting which only lasted a day and a half. It is noteworthy however, that members of the Abkhaz group liked him. They regretted the fact that they had too little time to communicate with him. We observed that Irakli Alasania also wanted to spend more time with the Abkhaz politicians. In Oxford, he offered to arrange a short-term closed meeting in the future, with fewer members and Stanislav Lakomba accepted this proposal.

I later realized that Mr. Alasania’s decision to minimize his attendance to the meeting was not his own. I believe that officials from higher political institutions ordered him to do this. However, I cannot prove this assumption.

Obvious Trend

According to the proposal of Irakli, we consulted with the parties and agreed to arrange a two-day meeting with fewer participants in Vienna, Austria at the end of July. The Abkhaz side was to be represented by Secretary of the de-facto Security Council of Abkhazia Stanislav Lakoba, de-facto Vice-Premier Leonid Lakerbaia, Chairman of the de-facto Central Election Commission Batal Tabaghua and Advisor to the de-facto President of Abkhazia Sokrat Jinjolia. Irakli Alasania offered to invite the following members of the Georgian group – Head of the President’s Chancellery Gigi Ugulava (currently Tbilisi City Mayor); Chairman of the Defense and Security Committee of the Parliament of Georgia Nika Rurua (currently Minister of Culture) and Irakli Alasania himself.

Everybody agreed to participate in the meeting. Gigi Ugulava and Irakli Alasania reported to President Saakashvili about their meeting and he agreed to participate in it.

After Gigi Ugulava occupied the position of Tbilisi City Mayor, Alasania offered MP Giga Bokeria a chance to participate in the meeting (Bokeria had already participated in the 13th meeting in Berlin, May, 2004). Bokeria requested time to consider the invitation, but he did not give any reply for quite a long time. After consulting with Irakli Alasania, we agreed to invite the Chairwoman of the Parliamentary Majority Maia Nadiradze to the meeting. She became interested in the meeting and agreed with Mr. Alasania to participate in it.

The meeting was fixed for July 31, in Vienna. Irakli Alasania was to arrive in Vienna from the United States on the morning of July 31. However, On July 28, I received a call from the Office of the Defense and Security Committee of the Parliament and was informed of Nika Rurua’s sudden decision – for uncertain reasons he could not travel to Vienna and requested that I cancel the air-tickets that were booked for him. I tried to get in touch with Nika Rurua but it was unsuccessful. Unfortunately, he has not clarified to me or Irakli Alasania why he was unable to contact us or provide a reason for his sudden cancellation. I immediately called Maia Nadiradze. Apologetically, she informed me that she too would not be able to make it to Vienna for the meeting. She explained that she had other very important business obligations to attend to.  Unfortunately, she did not consider it necessary to provide the real reasons for her absence.

We were in deadlock. The sudden cancellation of two Georgian politicians made the meeting scandalous. The Abkhaz group had already left for Moscow and would connect to Vienna from there. Irakli Alasania was coming from the USA and only his participation on the Georgian side as a politician could cause a political scandal in Abkhazia. It is noteworthy that by that time, Irakli Alasania not only represented the president in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, but he was also the Chairman of the Council of Ministers for the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic. Because of his rank and  position, Abkhaz politicians avoided meeting with him. The Abkhaz politicians agreed to participate in the meeting in Vienna only because he had a secondary position – as Representative of the President of Georgia – as well as the fact that he participated in it together with Georgian politicians and the meeting was informal. Suddenly, this agreement was changed and Mr. Alasanaia – Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic – was to meet the Abkhaz politicians. Keeping the abovementioned situation in mind, it was better to cancel the meeting altogether. We called Mr. Alasania and informed him of  the situation. He did not have information about the cancellations of Rurua and Nadiradze. In order to save the situation, we decided to invite State Minister Goga Khaindrava (currently the leader of the opposition) to the meeting. Alasanaia personally called the minister and explained to him the situation and the latter agreed to participate in the meeting, as he had high political responsibility.

The state minister offered to invite his Deputy Giorgi Volski from the Georgian side and the crisis seemed to be eradicated. Goga Khaindrava expressed to his chief– the former Prime-Minister of Georgia Zurab Noghaideli- the importance of the Vienna meeting and the necessity of his traveling there; the latter gave him permission to participate in the meeting.

On the evening of July 29, I was called from Alasania’s office and they asked – is it true that the Vienna meeting is supposed to fail and that Mr. Alasania is going back to Tbilisi? I replied to them that everything was in order and communicated that the meeting was definitely going to be held on the fixed dates. However, the final phone-call worried me. I again got in touch with Mr. Khaindrava who once more confirmed that he was going to participate in the meeting without any problems. I called Alasania in New York; he inquired as to whether Khaindrava was definitely going to Vienna. When I informed him that the state minister had principle position to participate in the meeting, Alasania also confirmed that he was going to Vienna. On July 30, the Georgian group of – Khaindrava, Volski and Zakareishvili traveled to Vienna and Irakli Alasania was supposed to join us the next morning.

As we later found out, Alasania’s administrative personnel was  already busy changing his  flight from New-York – Vienna for  later travel. It seemed increasingly clear that Alasania was not supposed to take part in the meeting. However, nobody intended to inform us on time.

On the first morning of the meeting on 31 July, I received a SMS from Alasania asking me to call him immediately. He informed me that regrettably he would not be able to attend the meeting and would not be able to meet with the Abkhaz people. He was unable to tell me exactly why however. He then apologized to both the organizers and the members of the Abkhaz group. When the morning session began, I apologized to the participants for the misunderstanding and explained that Mr. Alasania’s absence was due to him having to prolong his business-leave in Washington and New York. The representatives of the Abkhaz side, more precisely Stanislav Lakoba, immediately pointed out that this fact once more demonstrated the attempt of President Saakashvili to damage or destroy Georgia’s relations with the Abkhaz side. After providing them with the information, we discussed the topic with the Abkhaz politicians who expressed their doubts that these problems were a realization of the strange and unjustified policy of the government of Georgia. And apparently, it exposed the dangerous and suspicious aims of the policy of the Georgian government. I have no doubt that both Rurua and Nadiradze’s unclear and sudden refusal to participate in the meeting was caused by the demand of the President of Georgia. It is interesting that neither Nika Rurua, nor Giga Bokeria and Maia Nadiradze considered it necessary to call Alasania to inform him of their cancellations.

We can say that the general idea of the meeting failed because its principle purpose was Alasania’s rapprochement to the high-ranking officials of Abkhazia’s de-facto government. However, the State Minister Giorgi Khaindrava improved his positions through this meeting because only his institution met the Abkhaz group.

The Vienna meeting demonstrated a new and very evident dynamic: The Abkhaz side made a sincere attempt to find a source of constructive dialogue with the Georgian side, while the Georgian side did its best to block all attempts at constructive reconciliation.

What Is Going On?

It is difficult to say exactly what the cause and aim was of the strange and irrational position in Georgian-Abkhaz relations, but it did expose the goals of the policy, which are:

•    not to allow permanent informal Georgian-Abkhaz dialogue between those people who have political responsibilities to their societies;
•    not to allow the establishment of counter-trust and common interests between Georgian and Abkhaz peoples without the participation of Russia and international organizations;
•    to support the discrediting and the increasing   mistrust towards the projects that took the form  of  the “Schlaining Process” in order to prevent all Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian peace-building processes from reaching success beyond the control of Georgian policy.

There might be concrete reasons for which the activities promoting the year-long experience in the peace-building process were blocked. However, because I lack the solid evidence to back these reasons, I can only make assumptions and/or theorize as to why the peace-building process was blocked.

Theory I.  Saakashvili publicly announced several times that any meetings with separatists shall be held in Georgian territory only and that he cannot welcome the meetings taking place abroad. For example, on September 30, 2005 I accidentally met Nika Rurua. He was surprised to hear that the meeting was held in Vienna. He was sure that the meeting had failed. It is strange that one of the most active and famous members of parliament did not know and did not care about the fate of the meeting which he had declined anyway. Additionally, when I asked whether it was worth holding similar meetings in the future, he replied to me several times, stating that it would be good if the Abkhaz people would come to Tbilisi! So, Mr. Rurua indirectly confirmed that the reason behind his refusal to participate in the meetings in Vienna was due to the Georgian government’s insistence that the meetings be held only in Georgian territory.  In 1994-1995, this position was common within the circle of the former Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia Tamaz Nadareishvili. They later admitted this position was negative and so began participating in meetings outside of Georgia. Mikheil Saakashvili personally revived this position after he was elected to president. Unfortunately, nobody has clarified what threats and challenges are foreseen by the Georgian government by having two-sided informal meetings abroad when there is really no alternative to these meetings. This is an extremely superficial and incompetent position. It contradicts the basic principles and theories of conflict regulation. I feel this position itself is a potential threat because it turns Georgia into a hostage of its own irrational politics.

First of all, Georgia should be eager to annul the status quo situation in the conflict. It should do its best to find sources for trust-building and cooperation with the Abkhaz and Ossetian sides which will allow us to better understand their interests, challenges and fears. The best way to permanently exchange and receive information about the ongoing political process in Abkhazia and the former autonomous oblast of South Ossetia is to conduct two-sided informal meetings. As a result of the previous years, there is a stable format for similar relations. Ignoring or failing to implement this format will seriously damage the state interests of Georgia.

Unlike the Georgians – both the Abkhazian and Ossetian peoples wish to distance themselves from Georgia both in time and space. If we force our conditions on them for the implementation of the permanent two-sided meetings, they will be glad not to do it. The point remains, we need to finally figure out whether we need two-sided, permanent and informal political dialogue with the leading politicians of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And if we think it is necessary, then we should meet Abkhaz and Ossetian politicians in the territories which are most acceptable to them; this process is more advantageous for us than it is for them. In summary, the Georgian policy that insists that all meetings with separatists should be held only in Georgian territory is counter-productive to Georgia. It would be nice if politicians and experts would discuss this issue. Unfortunately, similar policy decisions are made without any discussions or expert collective input on the issue.

Theory II: The government seriously discusses the resolution of the current conflicts through armed conflict.  The Defense Minister and Chairman of the Defense and Security Committee of the Parliament, his deputy and even the President of Georgia announce this policy position regularly. If we accept this, then it is natural that the government does not embrace trust-building relations with the Abkhaz and Ossetian sides. As a result of these permanent informal meetings, if the parties begin a serious peace-building process, then withdrawal from this process by the Georgian side will cast doubt over the support of our partners and population. Consequently, by non-participation in these informal meetings, the Georgian side avoids future responsibility. If this version is actually grounded, then the current action of the government of Georgia is completely logical and justified; though immoral.

Georgia continues the practice of “megaphonic diplomacy”. In other words, the Georgian side communicates with the leaders of the separatist side only through press releases, official statements and via television news releases. This provides the Georgian side the chance to blame the other side for the lack of progress with regard to conflict resolution. As well, it provides an opportunity for the Georgian side to justify the inevitability of using armed conflict instead of bi-lateral talks as a means to settle the dispute peacefully.

Theory III: It might seem like a paradox, but Russia can also be an important factor. The unbridled and defiant role of Russia in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict and the realization that their interests and methods are well-known is an important factor. Russia is the only party which is not eager to hold regular two-sided Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian permanent dialogue. Consequently, one of the most effective tools to weaken Russian interests and influences is by conducting successive processes of two-sided relations.

Keeping in mind the above, we should also discuss those situations where Russian interests might have impacted Georgian politics. But, how can the Russian factor influence the President of Georgia? Mikheil Saakashvili’s aggressive anti-Russian statements and actions are well-known. It is difficult to name any politician in the Georgian government who lobbies on behalf of the state interests of Russia aside from the president’s uncle- Teimuraz Alasania. With this thought process, we can create a chain of logic. Because of the lack of evidence however, speaking only based on assumptions might lead us only to conjecture, or to false results. This version has a right to exist but we should supervise and regularly work out the information. I cannot think of another person who can lobby for Russian interests with President Saakashvili.
 
Theory IV: Former Personal Representative of the President of Georgia in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict – Irakli Alasania as a factor: According to the available information that exists among expert society, Irakli Alasania is considered to be one of those perspective politicians who falls within the interests of the US Administration. Georgian printed media has also published several times that Irakli Alasania might occupy the position of the head of the law enforcement institution. The possibility cannot be excluded that, those who consider Alasania to be their alternative, try to prevent him from the development of a successful political career. It is evident that there is a person or power in the Georgian authority who is stronger and has more rights in conflict-resolution activities than Irakli Alasania when he had similar status (on June 12, 2006 the Personal Representative of the President in Georgian-Abkhaz negotiations Irakli Alasania was appointed to the position of Ambassador of Georgia in the UN. Thus he was estranged from the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict resolution process). But, there is a counter-argument against this theory: Irakli Alasania had no connection to the Georgian-Ossetian meeting in February of 2005 which failed after President Saakashvili’s interference.

Theory V:The Factor of Paata Zakareishvili: I have been participating in the various formats of the Georgian-Abkhaz project since 1996 which- as a rule, are initiated by civil society. Most of these meetings are two-sided and informal. Without any exceptions, my participation in these meetings was as a member of Georgian civil society. In parallel to this, I am a member of the Georgian Republic Party. After the values of the Republic Party and the National Movement (the ruling party) diverged from one another other, the possibility cannot be excluded that governmental officials have become suspicious of my membership in the Republic Party and want to remove me from the process of informal dialogue. As a rule, when I ask whether the authority dislikes me – I always receive a very insincere reply – no! The government has never tried – directly, indirectly or through a third party – to demonstrate their negative attitude towards me. It would have been an extremely unconstructive and reckless decision by the ruling party to refuse participation in the important process on my account. If the government refuses to participate in these meetings because of me, then I will offer them my place in the meetings and let them launch a similar or better project with the support of their own contacts and I will continue to maintenance the dialogue between Georgian, Abkhaz and Ossetian societies with my own resources in order not to stop the exchange of the strategically important information and the trust-building process.

I doubt my personal inadmissibility was essential in failing the process. I think the positions between mine and the ruling party is irrelevant. The determinative of the irrelevance is the difference between the military politics of the government of Georgia and increasing the desire of the peace-building policy within Georgian society. The ruling party should be aware that my removal from the peace-building strategy is impossible. I am not going to refuse to participate in this project and will continue to inform Abkhaz and Ossetian societies as well as Georgian society about the grounded and alternative Georgian position with the support of my own resources.

If the government opposes my position, I think it is not a restriction of the activities of the political opponent but a futile attempt of the government to oppose the proposals which are acceptable for Abkhaz and Ossetian societies. I am not the only person who puts forth an alternative Georgian position that is different from the government’s position; an important part of Georgian civil society, among them IDPs, is involved in the peace-building process.

Theory VI:Banal jealousy of the President of Georgia towards his colleagues. It is not impossible to imagine that Saakashvili does not wish to develop processes without his personal control which might support the creation of self-confident politicians within his administration. If any politician manages to achieve serious success on such a complicated issue which is still in deadlock, he/she will definitely increase his/her political value in society and with the voters. This success might create a serious competitor for Saakashvili. If this version is grounded enough to exist, then all the above mentioned theories have its corresponding explanation and logic. So, Saakashvili is ready to bury the stable format of conflict resolution in order to prevent others from succeeding. In addition, it is easy to explain why the participants refused to participate in the meetings so suddenly. Apparently, they made decisions against their own will under oppression. Thus the organizers and donor organizations of the meetings become hostages of the vague position of the government. In the frame of unstable and unclear policy, they cannot plan meetings and most importantly, they are not interested in launching similar projects in the future. Maybe, the author of this version is focused on similar outputs.

IF this version really exists, Saakashvili will be concerned by the success of the ongoing dialogue beyond his control. He might wish for the Georgian group members to agree with him. The organizers of the meetings think this is not right. In this case the format of the project will be profaned. The participants will have to demonstrate not their own positions, but rather the positions of the Georgian President. The meetings will be similar to official meetings of delegations where the protection of the positions of political leaders is important and neither side attempts to learn the positions and interests of the other side. Consequently, we will receive more useless negotiations instead of dialogue.

 Theory VIII:  It is also not impossible to believe that the government has its own double contracts with Abkhaz and Ossetian parties. In this case, I think myself or other experts would have had more-or-less reliable information about this parallel process. However, the possibility cannot be excluded that the confidentiality of these dialogues is highly reserved. If this version exists, and if the government acknowledges the necessity of similar meetings, then it is illogical to prevent and misuse other similar meetings or to regularly check existing or supposed information.

What can we do?
 
This process should not stop no matter what its real cause is. If it is stopped, the opponents will achieve their goal and have an illusion that they can not only control but also administer processes independent from their own. It is evident that government representatives cannot make decisions independently and at the last minute; they are forced to be influenced, that is why every meeting faces danger. In order to sustain a continuous process, we should invite those people, who, according to the myth established in the society do not obey President Saakashvili and his surroundings, but their recommendations and sentences are still considered in high governmental bodies. The representatives of this powerful group think that collaborating with Saakashvili’s government will limit the risk of serious and fatal mistakes from the governmental bodies. Without this kind of collaboration, they think that an irremediable negative process can develop in the country. If this group is really maintaining independence and influencing high government officials, then their participation in the next “Schlaining format” meetings would be advisable. I think these kinds of political figures are: Levan Ramishvili, Aleksandre Rondeli, Davit Darchiashvili and Gia Nodia. If these people are sure that the process is profitable and its stopping would be disadvantageous for solving the conflict peacefully, then their solutions and proposals should influence Saakashvili and his surroundings and the consideration of the government’s interests and proposals in the process of the meetings will be significant. However,  if the government still continues blocking the mutual meetings with Abkhazian and Ossetian sides, then we can boldly say that we tried our best to advance the consideration of all the proposals of the ruling party in the peace process, but were always ignored (after a while we offered all the above mentioned individuals to participate in these kinds of meetings, but everybody but Darchiashvili refused to meet Abkhazian politicians). From now on, their consistent refusal for collaboration gives us the opportunity to consider the interests of Georgian society in the first place and at best, involve the experts and the representatives of the political opposition in the meetings. Since the government is principally blocking the format of the meetings envisaged for their participation, we should expand the number of participants by involving the oppositional parties in it. If the government representatives continue ignoring the meetings, we will try to at least conduct the formal meetings and the opposition party representatives will be more enabled to present important and significant information to the Abkhazian and Ossetian sides. Also, government representatives should always have a remedy to join the process at any time or use our resources for implementing another format acceptable to them.

What was the result of these meetings?

Often I’m asked a rhetorical question: what was the result of these kinds of meetings? I think that these meetings, at least brought five significant results:
1.    It gave participants the feeling that any complicated topic or problem developed between the parties would be thoroughly discussed and they would be given non-populist and non-demagogic answers to their questions;

2.    It promoted the permanent and consistent exchange of information between the parties;

3.    In the format of these meetings the project on the “concept of special status of Abkhazians in Georgia” was established;

4.    In the format of these meetings, Iraklia Alasania’s phenomenon was established and developed;

5.    It raised the trust of the Abkhazian side (their politicians and experts) towards these kinds of meetings.

Continuation of the story

On March 18-20th, 2006, the 17th seminar-dialogue was held in the series of “Shlaining process” of Georgian-Abkhazian meetings. A month ago, Mr. Nika Gvaramia, Irakli Alasania and Davit Bakradze expressed their desire to participate in this meeting. A week earlier however, all three of them, due to different reasons refused to go to London. At last minute, we were forced to fill in the empty places with Ivliane Khaindrava, Vakhtang Kolbaia and Davit Bazghadze. On June 9-13th of 2006 in the town of Shlaining, Austria, the 18th seminar-dialogue of the “Schlaining process” series of Georgian Abkhazian meetings was planned. For April 20th, Irakli Alasania and Nika Gvaramia independently expressed their desire to participate in the meeting. On May 9th, both Alasania and Gvaramia refused to take part in the meeting.

At the 19th meeting of the “Shlaining process” held on December 15-18th of 2006, officials of the Foreign Ministry Giorgi Loria and Giorgi Volski refused to participate. The next meeting of the “Shlaining process” was planned for July 27-30, 2007 in London. There was a preliminary agreement with the Parliament members, Representatives of the Majority Davit Bazghadze and Roin Janashia and with the Security Council Representative Giorgi Kajaia. But seven days before their departure, all three of them refused to participate in the meeting. On Friday July 20th , Davit Bazghadze contacted me and said that Parliament Chairman Nino Burjanadze categorically asked him and Janashia to refuse to go to London. Burjanadze stated to Bazghadze “we (probably meaning the Georgian government) will not participate in these kinds of meetings.” A year ago, it was exactly she who allowed Davit Bazghadze to participate in the 17th Schlaining meeting in March of 2006. It is interesting to know what changed over a year. What format did Burjanadze participate in or what kind of format did she want to participate in? The fact is, no kind of dialogue took place with the Abkhazian side. It’s suspicious that the conditions for conducting informal dialogue for which Burjanadze’s team members would participate were never presented to the organizers.

On September 21-25th of 2007, the German organization “Bergoph Conflict Constructive Management Research Center” conducted Georgian-Abkhazian meeting on Cyprus participating in which was refused by the Deputy State Ministers Ruslan Abashidze and Dimitry Manjavidze.

The next consultations conducted by “reconciliation resources” made it possible to conduct the next-21st meeting of the “Schlaining process.” Despite the serious tenseness in the conflict zone during June and July of 2008, the Abkhazian side-specifically the de-facto Foreign Minister of Abkhazia Sergey Shamba- gave principal consent for participating in the meeting organized by the Abkhazian side. The meeting was planned for July 27-30, 2008 in the city of London. In order to conduct the meeting without a problem and acceptable regime for government, the decision was made that Paata Zakareishvili would not take part in the meeting since the government representatives were obviously intimidated by him. The PM Petre Mamradze gave consent for participating in the meeting but asked for time so he would be able to consult with the Parliament leadership. These were government representatives willing to participate in the meeting. Three members of the parliament majority gave a firm and principal refusal for participating in the meeting. While the negotiations were continuing, Petre Mamradze refused to participate in the meeting, probably after the consultation with the Parliament leadership. After ineffective consultations with the Georgian side “Reconciliation resource” made a decision to postpone for an uncertain period, the “Schlaining format” planned for the end of July. . On August 4th, 2008, Security Council secretary Aleksandre (Kakha) Lomaia stated “let’s not deceive ourselves. It is necessary to conduct dialogue with Russia and not go [in]between Sokhumi and Tskhinvali.”

4 days were left before August 8…

The article was published in the newspaper “Resonance” (# 256-257-259)
September 19, 20, 22, 2008

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