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Report of the Mission of Observers of the International Expert Centre for Electoral Systems in the Presidential Elections in Georgia, 6th January 2008

January 8, 2008

Report of the Mission of Observers of the International Expert Centre for Electoral Systems in the Presidential Elections in Georgia, 6th January 2008.

A mission from the International Expert Centre for Electoral Systems (ICES) which includes 51international observers from Israel, Great Britain and the USA, should like to present a report on the preparations and procedures of the Presidential Elections in Georgia, which took place on the 5th of January.

ICES is a non-profit, non-government, public organization set up by a group of qualified experts in the fields of law, political sciences, diplomacy and sociology. Experts from ICES have a vast experience in the political monitoring and management of electoral preparations and processes in different countries. On 21st July 2007, the International Expert Centre for Electoral Systems (ICES) was registered by the UN Electoral Assistance Division and added to the list of non-government organizations endorsing the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation.

19 members of the delegation arrived in Georgia on 24th December 07, while 32 members came for a short period just before the elections. The delegation was distributed around the following towns in Georgia: Batumi, Gori, Marnauli, Telavi, Zugdidi, Achaliziche and Tbilisi.

The work of the group that arrived on 24th December included activities intended to prepare the ground for the entire mission during and after the elections, as follows:

  1. Meetings with the electoral districts committees and their chairmen in Tbilisi, and with most of the representatives and leaders at the headquarters of the presidential candidates.
  2. Most of the district committees delivered the relevant information. However, some committees did not supply information on the statistics of voters in their districts or other relevant details, therefore, the total picture in these districts was somewhat obscure. It is possible that some chairmen of the electoral committees were unaware of the standard procedures relating to their duties and these aspects were therefore overlooked.
  3. Additional lists of voters supplied by the Central Elections Committee were not sufficiently clear. There were a number of lapses in information as well as issues regarding the up-to-date residential addresses of voters. It would appear that some members of the election committees were not sufficiently informed on the procedures and regulations governing elections.
  4. According to the statistics received from different sources, the total number of voters eligible to participate in Georgia’s elections is approximately M2.3. This compares with an estimated population of M3.7, taking into account the emigration of approximately M1.2 people during the last 2 decades. However, it was impossible to receive a more factual explanation from the Central Elections Committee as to how these figures had increased to over M3.5. Furthermore, it was questionable whether the Georgian government had announced their intention to give an opportunity for Georgian citizens who are resident in the autonomic regions of Abkchazia and South Ossetia to vote, and how they were planning to implement this.
  5. In addition, no satisfactory explanation was offered for the system of candidates’ campaigning in the polling stations, while some committee members seemed to be unaware of where and when the campaigning had to cease.
  6. Questions were raised regarding the video cameras which had been placed in polling stations. The Central Elections Committee had said the cameras were necessary in order to monitor activities during the elections in case of rioting or disturbances. The standpoint, however, was that the cameras may have been intimidating to some voters, in city areas, and especially in the peripheral areas by creating a feeling of ‘Big Brother’ watching them.
  7. There was no adequate explanation as to why election procedures for the Presidential Elections involving plebiscites to the Georgian Parliament and the joining of NATO appeared to be subject to obstructions and complications.
  8. The delegation questioned the choice of 5th January 2008 for holding the elections as this was during an important holiday period, when people would be occupied with the festivities and therefore not in the frame of mind to give sufficient thought to the selection of a political candidate.
  9. It was observed that most candidates in Tbilisi are not sufficiently exposed to voters as could be expected. Most of the TV broadcasting disproportionately dealt with Candidate 5, while the other candidates were relatively marginalized. Similarly, this was the case for advertising on public transportation vehicles, on the streets and on the city’s buildings, where Number 5 was the only candidate who was offered congratulations for the New Year. The campaigning for Candidate 5 had begun in Israel in December 2007 with large banners hanging over the highway and some of the buildings in Tel Aviv.
  10. On 4th January, the ‘Day of Silence’, some of the TV channels continued to broadcast information concerning Candidate 5 on a disproportionate level and during prime time.
  11. Meetings had been arranged with the Candidates or their Representatives, who discussed their campaigns. They expressed critical opinions and frustrations over the election campaigning by Candidate 5, who had utilized state budgets, resources and institutions for his political and electoral purposes. One of the representatives complained that video cameras had been installed by the Secret Service, the State Security Service and Military Intelligence at the entrance to the headquarters. When asked the reason for this, the response had been that it prevented businessmen from contributing financial support to the candidate and unauthorized entry into the building.
  12. Several requests had been made to the head of the Central Elections Committee to hold a press conference in the new Press Centre. After a number of promises, these requests had been rejected by Mr Nugzar Kupreishvili on the grounds that this would set a precedent, among other simplistic excuses.
  13. ICES members in different towns returned reports which were critical of some of the electoral practices they had observed. For example, feedback from two of these towns, Kutaisi and Achalziche, were full of critical information about incorrect electoral procedures, for example, the use of video cameras in the polling stations as an instrument of intimidation and fear. In addition,at least one of these cameras was trained on voters as they cast their votes. Ballot boxes were not correctly opened and sealed. Police officers were present in the polling booths and this again added to the feeling of intimidation. There were no clear instructions to the commissions of the polling stations from their local central committee. In Achalziche there was a high turnout (70%), however intimidation was present in threats against voters, their jobs and their families. The speed of voting was disproportional to the number of voters, when in a very short time, several hundred people had supposedly voted.

In summary, the mission presents in this report their findings and some of the conclusions over the procedures and campaign strategies of the election process in Georgia.

The Presidential Elections in Georgia overall did not measure up satisfactorily to the standards of International Electoral norms and organisation. While it may be possible that insufficient thought and planning had been invested in the organisation and procedures of the elections from the outset, there was an obvious inclination towards the election campaign of Candidate 5. The preparations had been full of accusations of malpractice from all candidates aimed at Candidate 5, which may not have been entirely without foundation.

Consequently, the elections could not be confirmed as transparent or completely open according to the standards of the international elections code, therefore resulting in the problems mentioned above. A more detailed, final report will be published in the near future.

Dr Alexander Tsinker – Head of Mission

Mr Baruch Ben Neria, Ambassador – Deputy Head of Mission

Mrs Wilda Minott – Secretary of Mission

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