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Abkhazia: counting the costs of conflict

April 30, 2010
Two years after the devastating dispute with Georgia, the breakaway region is now troubled by its new friend Russia

Anna Matveeva

Abkhazia may have been a holiday destination for the Soviet top brass 20 years ago, but now, Russian budget tourists who cannot afford a package to Turkey and don't mind strolling along semi-ruins will fill its beaches in the summer. They will discover that price comparison does not work in Abkhazia's favour anymore, while comfortable hotels and decent infrastructure are still lacking.

On the surface, the Abkhaz have got what they wanted: security from a Georgian attack, which they feared for 15 years. Since the August 2008 war in South Ossetia, Russia has moved its troops to Abkhazia, recognised its independence and provided security guarantees. It paid a considerable political price for this internationally. The "Georgian enemy" looming large in Abkhaz politics and society suddenly became irrelevant. The cornerstone of modern Abkhazia's identity, based on the history of resistance against all odds, requires a more forward-looking position. But what would that be?

Fears of Russian domination now expand into a vacuum left by the removal of the "Georgian threat". Russians might take over the best resorts by investing in hotels, restaurants and nightclubs. They can buy, through third parties, holiday homes along the coast. Plenty of foodstuffs come from the Russian side, following the decay of agriculture in Abkhazia and depopulation of the farmlands, from where many Georgians fled during the 1992–1993 war. The presence of Russian troops threatens the demographic balance, especially if servicemen start to settle down, marry and bring up children in Abkhazia. Russia-sponsored development projects attract teams of labour migrants, and, according to this logic, Moldovans and Tajiks can begin to replace the expelled Georgians. This is hardly a desirable outcome, if the political supremacy of the Abkhaz group is to be preserved.

The Georgian side is understandably unhappy with the situation, but is powerless to change it either by mounting a military threat or through diplomatic pressure. Tbilisi has to satisfy itself with the Geneva talks, which are essentially a forum to maintain stability – preserving the status quo rather than altering it. Assertive rhetoric at home and abroad masks the inability to find ways to solve the Abkhazia problem or to accept the loss of the territory. It is doubtful whether the current Georgian leadership places any serious hopes in talking to the Abkhaz. However, its international stance as a "victim of Russian aggression" to attract western solidarity brought about very real results in terms of the US and EU's financial assistance after the 2008 war. In the future, the Georgian establishment would have to choose how long it can pursue the same course without it turning into a self-perpetuating discourse.

The sad truth is that there are striking similarities between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides. Minorities do not feature very well in politics or big business. Rhetoric of security and nationalism is still a popular commodity. This mindset has not fundamentally altered, as both societies struggle with the same dilemmas of relations with Russia and a choice whether to base political development on the primacy of the titular group or on an ideology of an inclusive multi-ethnic society. The main difference is that Georgia proper is more open to international scrutiny.
Moscow's interest in Abkhazia is mostly to do with security, as the territory could serve as the buffer zone in case Georgia joins Nato or suffers internal instability. The main development project is focused on road infrastructure. Abkhazia, no doubt, can offer interesting investment opportunities, but Russian businessmen are now geared towards the Sochi Olympics as the key project for the government, for which they could get kudos from Kremlin. Attitudes in Moscow are pragmatic, showing that it has little appetite to meddle with Abkhazia's internal politics or to take responsibility if things go wrong – it already has Dagestan and Ingushetia on its hands. And Russians are not under any illusion that the Abkhaz feel that Moscow is the best thing that ever happened to them.

The EU pursues a policy of "non-recognition, but engagement". In practice, it is hard to see what tangible political goals it tries to achieve other than preventing destabilisation and maintaining security. Abkhazia would like the EU to continue to be present, as it is reluctant to be left with Russia as its only friend – but the incentives for the EU to remain engaged are unclear.

The big dilemma now is the cost of conflict. For both societies, but especially for the Abkhaz, the conflict caused a massive loss of development opportunities that resulted in economic and social stagnation. In the choice between national expression and development, the former takes priority. Years of peacebuilding have not changed this. The frequently repeated phrase, "We want peace", runs hollow. It can mean "We want them to accept our gains and stop making a fuss," or, "We want them to give up their gains without the trouble of us going to war for this". Only a change in such thinking would allow the societies to move forward.

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